All Posts By

Stan Rule

B.C. Court of Appeal Confirms that Notaries are Not Permitted to Draw Wills with Life Estates

By | Sabey Rule Blog | No Comments

The British Columbia Court of Appeal confirmed that notaries public are not permitted to draw wills that create life estates or trusts in a decision released December 21, 2017. In British Columbia, generally only lawyers may practice law, which includes drawing wills for a fee. However, members of the Society of Notaries Public of British Columbia are also permitted to draw wills for a fee, but there are restrictions on the types of wills they may draw.  Specifically, as set out in section 18 of the Notaries Act, notaries may, Continue reading “B.C. Court of Appeal Confirms that Notaries are Not Permitted to Draw Wills with Life Estates” »

Supreme Court of Canada Decision on Proprietary Estoppel in Cowper-Smith v. Morgan

By | Sabey Rule Blog | No Comments

The Supreme Court of Canada rendered it judgment in Cowper-Smith v. Morgan, 2017 SCC 61, this last Thursday, December 14, 2017. The main legal issue is whether a person who relies on a promise that he will receive property to his detriment may become entitled to the property even if the person who made the promise did not own the property at the time she made the promise. Let me explain. Continue reading “Supreme Court of Canada Decision on Proprietary Estoppel in Cowper-Smith v. Morgan” »

Banton v. Banton (Part 4)

By | Sabey Rule Blog | No Comments

This is my fourth post, on the decision in Banton v. Banton, 1998 CanLII 1496, a case involving Muna Yassin who married George Banton when she was 31 and he, 88. The dispute was between Ms. Yassin in George Banton’s five children. I described in my first post Mr. Justice Cullity’s finding that two wills Mr. Banton made leaving his estate to Ms. Yassin were invalid on the grounds that he did not have the requisite mental capacity to make the wills, and that she exercised undue influence over him. In my second post, I outlined Mr. Justice Cullity’s finding that Mr. Banton’s marriage to Ms. Yassin was nevertheless valid, which had the effect of revoking the will Mr. Banton made before the marriage in which he left the residue of his estate to his five children. Continue reading “Banton v. Banton (Part 4)” »

Banton v. Banton (Part 3)

By | Sabey Rule Blog | No Comments

In my two previous posts, I’ve written about Mr. Justice Cullity’s decision in Bantonv. Banton,1998 CanLII 1496, a case involving Muna Yassin who married George Banton when she was 31 and he, 88. The dispute was between Ms. Yassin in George Banton’s five children. I described in my first post Mr. Justice Cullity’s finding that two wills Mr. Banton made leaving his estate to Ms. Yassin were invalid on the grounds that he did not have the requisite mental capacity to make the wills, and that she exercised undue influence over him. In my second post, I outlined Mr. Justice Cullity’s finding that Mr. Banton’s marriage to Ms. Yassin was nevertheless valid, which had the effect of revoking the will Mr. Banton made before the marriage in which he left the residue of his estate to his five children. Because Mr. Banton died without a valid will, Ms. Yassin was entitled to a large portion of his estate. Continue reading “Banton v. Banton (Part 3)” »

Banton v. Banton (Part 2)

By | Sabey Rule Blog | No Comments

In my post last week, I wrote about Mr. Justice Cullity’s decision in Banton v. Banton, 1998 CanLII 1496 finding that two wills made by George Banton, one dated December 21, 1994 and the other dated May 4, 1995 were invalid. In both wills, Mr. Banton had left his estate to Muna Yassin, whom he met after he moved into a retirement home, disinheriting his five children, who were his beneficiaries under his previous will. He and Ms. Yassin were married on a few days before he made the December 21, 1994 will, when he was 88 years of age, and she, 31. Mr. Justice Cullity found that Mr. Banton was suffering from delusions about his children when he made the wills, and he did not have the requisite capacity to make them, and that Ms. Yassin exercised undue influence to obtain the benefit of the wills. Accordingly, she did not benefit under the wills.

But I indicated that there were some twists. Today I will write about one. Continue reading “Banton v. Banton (Part 2)” »

Banton v. Banton (Part 1)

By | Sabey Rule Blog | No Comments

I have recently reread the case of Banton v. Banton, 1998 CanLII 14926, a decision of Mr. Justice Cullity of the Ontario Supreme Court. This case may be referred to as a predatory-marriage case. What interests me most, though, is the interplay of legal issues. Mr. Justice Cullity considers in his decision the capacity to make a will, and the impact of delusions on capacity, undue influence, the capacity to marry, the validity of a residence trust, and the use of a power of attorney to settle a trust. I think this case is well worth a few blog posts. I will start with the challenges to the validity of two wills. Continue reading “Banton v. Banton (Part 1)” »

Undue Influence by Inducing False Beliefs: Re: Patterson Estate

By | Sabey Rule Blog, Strata and Condo Law | No Comments

Undue influence usually implies coercion. Someone may challenge a will or a benefit in a will on the basis that another procured the will or benefit by applying pressure to the will maker. The pressure may be overt threats of violence, or perhaps subtler forms of pressure such as an implied threat by the will maker’s caregiver to withdraw care.

A recent decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Re: Patterson Estate, 2017 NSSC 221, identifies as undue influence a child procuring a will by inducing her mother to believe that her other children did not care about her.

Joan Patterson had four children, Reed Patterson, Randall Patterson, Darlene Marriott, and Marlene Patterson. She died on June 13, 2016, the age of 70, and her husband had died four months before. Marlene Patterson had been estranged from both of her parents for about 20 years, but reconciled in 2012. On March 4, 2016, Joan Patterson moved from her home into Marlene Patterson’s home. On May 13, 2016, she made a new will, leaving her estate to Marlene Patterson, disinheriting her other three children.

Mr. Justice Wright found that Joan Patterson’s will was properly signed and witnessed in accordance with Nova Scotia law. She knew and approved of the contents of the will, and she had testamentary capacity.

The decision turned on whether Marlene Patterson procured the will by fraudulently inducing her to disinherit her other children. Mr. Justice Wright quoted from John Poyser’s book Capacity and Undue Influence (which I have reviewed here) in setting out the legal issue:

[17] In pressing their grounds of fraud as a subspecies of undue influence, the applicants rely on the following passage from the text book Capacity and Undue Influence (Carswell 2014) authored by John E.S. Poyser (at pg. 318):

Testamentary undue influence is typically thought of in terms of coercion. There is good reason for that. Dozens of cases have stated that conduct must amount to coercion if it is to amount to testamentary undue influence. Yet there are also abundant comments in the same cases and others that open the door to characterize testamentary fraud as a second type of conduct that can amount to undue influence. Coercion forces a person to do something against his or her will. Fraud operates differently. Testamentary fraud is an effort to fool a person into believing a false state of affairs that is then instrumental in causing that person to make a testamentary gift that otherwise would not have been made. As indicated earlier, persuasion is permitted, but persuasion is not permitted when it is mounted on a foundation of deliberate lies. Testamentary undue influence by coercion is difficult to establish. It is often pled but rarely proved as the facts rarely sustain it. Undue influence by fraud will be more easily sustained. Isolation, falsehood, and ingratiation are a common recipe employed by predatory family and peers in a bid to subvert a vulnerable person’s property at death.

[18] In the pages that follow, the author traces the development of fraud as a subspecies of undue influence in the case law. He refers to the decisions in Anderson v. Walkey, 1961 CarswellOnt 91 and in Timlick v. Crawford, 1965 CarswellBC 86 as instances where Canadian courts have invalidated a Will on the grounds of undue influence, not as the result of coercion, but as the result of manipulation and deceit.

[19] It is also noted (at pg. 324) that the party alleging undue influence has to prove not only the impugned conduct but that it in fact caused the Will-maker to sign the Will.

Marlene Patterson’s sister and brothers alleged that she had manipulated her mother into making the will isolating them from their mother and making false statements about them. Darlene Marriott testified that Marlene Patterson had asked her to assist her in persuading their mother’s disinherit their brothers. It was also evident that Marlene Patterson assisted her mother and making notes for her meeting with the lawyer who drew the will.

Mr. Justice Wright found that Marlene Patterson did in fact induce her mother into making the will she did by manipulation.

[87] It is not only from these suspicious circumstances but rather from the evidence as a whole, including Marlene’s lack of credibility, that the Court is prepared to draw the inference that Joan was induced to form the false beliefs she held about her other childrens’ lack of caring, through manipulation and deceit on the part of Marlene under whose control she remained after the move. Joan then acted on those false beliefs in changing her Will as she did. I therefore find that the actions of Marlene, on a balance of probabilities, crossed the line into the sphere of undue influence. As noted earlier, while persuasion is permitted without legal consequence, persuasion of a testator is not permitted when it is mounted on a foundation of untruths induced by the proponent of a Will.

In the result, the May 13, 2016 will is invalid.